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Analysing shared competences  
in EU external action: the case  
for a politico-legal framework
Ries Kamphof and Ramses A Wessel*
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, the representation and performance of the 
European Union in international institutions in particular have been 
on the agenda of academics and practitioners alike.1 The widespread 
‘representation battle’ about the issuing of statements in 2011 at the 
United Nations is emblematic. Several dozen EU statements in the UN 
were blocked for a couple of months over deep disagreement, not on 
content but on the mere symbolic issue of who ‘delivers’ the statement: 
‘the EU’ or ‘the EU and its Member States’ in the United Nations. 
Internally, this issue was (only partly) solved by agreeing on a guideline 
* Ries Kamphof is a PhD candidate, Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and 
Global Affairs and Associate Fellow, Clingendael Institute; Ramses A Wessel is Professor of 
International and European Law and Governance, University of Twente.
1 Sebastian Oberthür, Knud Erik Jørgensen and Jamal Shahin, The Performance of the 
EU in International Institutions (1st edn, Routledge 2013); Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed), The 
European Union and International Organizations (Routledge 2009); Joachim A Koops and 
Gjovalin Macaj (eds), The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor (Springer 2014); Edith 
Drieskens and Louise G Van Schaik (eds), The EU and Effective Multilateralism: Internal 
and External Reform Practices (Routledge 2014); Thomas Gehring, Sebastian Oberthür and 
Marc Mühleck, ‘European Union Actorness in International Institutions: Why the EU is 
Recognized as an Actor in Some International Institutions, but Not in Others’ (2013) 51(5) 
JCMS 849 and Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Sophie Meunier, ‘Speaking With a Single 
Voice: Internal Cohesiveness and External Effectiveness of the EU in Global Governance’ 
(2014) 21(7) JEPP 961. For a legal approach see Christine Kaddous (ed), The European 
Union in International Organisations and Global Governance: Recent Developments (Hart 
Publishing 2015) and Ramses A. Wessel and Jed Odermatt (eds), Research Handbook on 
the EU’s Engagement with International Organisations (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018; 
forthcoming).
© 2018, Ries Kamphof and Ramses A Wessel • This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of 
the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY) 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which 
permits  unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source 
are credited • DOI: https://doi.org/10.14324/111.444.ewlj.2018.02.
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for ‘general arrangements for EU statements’.2 The UN-representation 
saga is symptomatic of the difficulties that both EU and Member States 
actors experience more generally in international organizations and at 
international conferences. 
In a similar vein, debates on the conclusion of international 
agreements show that the post-Lisbon external relations regime has 
remained unclear as far as the exact competence division is concerned. 
This often leaves the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
to decide on the line of demarcation between EU and Member State 
external competences. Recent examples include Opinion 2/15 on the 
EU–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (related to the scope of foreign 
direct investment) and Opinion 3/15 on the Marrakesh Treaty (related 
to the question of EU exclusive competence in the area of the copyright 
of published works for persons with reading disabilities).3 In the case of 
the EU–Singapore Agreement, on 21 December 2016 Advocate General 
(AG) Sharpston argued that the Agreement can only be concluded by 
the European Union and the Member States acting jointly.4 Whereas 
the Commission argued that the Agreement could be concluded as 
an ‘EU-only’ agreement, the AG points to a number of elements in the 
Agreement in relation to which the EU lacks an exclusive competence. At 
the same time, it is clear that the choice for ‘mixity’ is not always purely 
legal. As openly phrased by EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström 
in relation to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
between the EU and Canada (CETA): ‘From a strict legal standpoint, 
the Commission considers this agreement to fall under exclusive EU 
competence. However, the political situation in the Council is clear, and 
we understand the need for proposing it as a “mixed” agreement, in 
order to allow for a speedy signature.’5
These discussions are driven by (legal) competence divisions and 
(political) power relations. It is no secret that in Member States the idea 
is gaining momentum that the EU gradually takes over competences 
3 Respectively, Request for an opinion submitted by the European Commission pursuant 
to Article 218(11) TFEU (Opinion 2/15), 3 November 2015, 2015/C 363/22, OJ C 363/18 
and Request for an opinion submitted by the European Commission pursuant to Article 
218(11) TFEU (Opinion 3/15), 21 September 2015, 2015/C 311/15, OJ C 311/13.
4 Opinion 2/15 of AG Sharpston, 21 December 2016; ECLI:EU:C:2016:992.
5 European Commission press release, ‘European Commission proposes signature and 
conclusion of EU–Canada trade deal’, Strasbourg, 5 July 2016 <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm>.
2 Council of the European Union, ‘General Arrangements for EU Statements in Multilateral 
Organizations’, 15901/11 <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%20
15901%202011%20INIT>.
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that were originally envisaged to remain with the Member States.6 
The issue of the division of competences between the EU and its 
Member States is a delicate question, which is often brought back to 
either diminishing the ‘creeping’ competences of the EU or – instead – 
supporting the notion of a ‘single voice’.7 These approaches around 
the ‘single voice mantra’ correlating EU unity and EU influence8 are 
traditionally popular in political EU studies but do not seem to do 
justice to the complexities of everything that can be placed under the 
heading ‘shared competences’. After all, most EU external relations are 
not characterized by ‘exclusivity’ and the number of areas in which the 
EU can act without the Member States are in fact limited.9 A quick look 
at the international agreements concluded by the EU since the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty reveals that the large majority of them 
are constructed as mixed agreements.10 This implies that in most of its 
external relations, the EU and its Member States will not only have to 
find a way to work together, but they will also have to explain to the rest 
of the world that in most cases the political hassle originates from legal 
complexities that are part and parcel of the EU’s set-up.
Traditionally, this multifaceted problem of political hassle around 
legal competences is still largely studied from single academic perspec-
tives, leaving both academic disciplines with a number of unanswered 
questions. While a certain level of attention for policy and politics 
in legal scholarship is visible in the writings of colleagues,11 mutual 
literature references in legal and political research on EU external 
action remain scarce. The present authors believe that more insight 
 7 Mark A Pollack, ‘The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy-making since Maastricht’ 
(2000) 38(3) JCMS 519.
 8 Macaj and Nicolaidis, ‘Beyond “one voice”? Global Europe’s Engagement with its Own 
Diversity’ (2014) 21(7) JEPP 1067, 1067.
 9 Bart van Vooren and Ramses A Wessel, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (CUP 2014) 99.
10 International agreements can be found in the EU Treaty Database. See more extensively: 
Guillaume Van der Loo and Ramses A Wessel, ‘Legal Effects of the Non-Ratification of 
Mixed Agreements’ (2017) 54(3) CMLR 735.
11 Examples in EU external relations law include Paul James Cardwell (ed), EU External 
Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (Asser Press 2012), as well as the prolific 
writings of Marise Cremona, including her ‘A Reticent Court? Policy Objectives and the 
Court of Justice’ in Marise Cremona and Anne Thies (eds), The European Court of Justice 
and External Relations Law – Constitutional Challenges (Hart Publishing 2014) and ‘External 
Relations and External Competence: the Emergence of an Integrated Policy’, in G de Búrca 
and P Craig (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011).
 6 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Review of the Balance of Competences between 
the United Kingdom and the European Union: Foreign Policy’, 22 July 2013, available 
at <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/foreign-policy-report-review-of-the- 
balance-of-competences>.
 ANALysiNg sHARED cOmPETENcEs iN EU ExTERNAL AcTiON  41
can be generated when findings in political theory are more clearly 
combined (and/or confronted) with legal analyses. Over the years, 
calls for more cross-disciplinary research may be found in both legal 
and political science contributions on the role and functioning of the 
EU in international institutions.12 We believe that empirical insight in 
the daily practice of the use of shared competences by the EU and its 
Member States at international institutions13 such as the United Nations 
could add to the existing body of knowledge by not only focusing on the 
formal division of competences but also on the more practical power 
relations ‘on the ground’. Legal rules by themselves do not guarantee a 
preferred outcome, while political performance often relies on existing 
legal competences and a subsequent division of powers. A more 
integrative analytical framework may help us in further combining legal 
and political considerations.
This paper aims to make the case for such an integrative 
framework to analyse the use and effect of EU shared competences in 
international institutions by combining legal and political perspectives. 
We use the substance of the policy area of climate change to provide 
relevant practical information. The main question to be answered 
is ‘which factors should form part of an “integrative” legal-political 
analysis of shared EU and Member State external action?’
This contribution is structured as follows. After exploring the state 
of the art of legal and political theory on the nexus between the EU 
and international organizations and shared (external) competences, a 
preliminary application of both political and legal findings on the well-
documented policy area of climate change is shared. The state of the 
art and first findings lead to the basic elements and building blocks of 
what could become an ‘integrative analytical framework’ of EU external 
action in policy areas of shared competence. We will also point to 
challenges and limitations of such an integrative approach. The article 
concludes by suggesting avenues for future research.
12 Knud Erik Jørgensen and Ramses A Wessel, ‘The Position of the European Union in 
(Other) International Organizations: Confronting Legal and Political Approaches’ in Panos 
Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Edward Elgar 
2011), 261; Lisanne Groen and Arne Niemann, ‘The European Union at the Copenhagen 
Climate Negotiations: a Case of Contested EU Actorness and Effectiveness’ (2013) 27(3) IR 
308, 320 and Sebastian Oberthür and Lisanne Groen, ‘The Effectiveness Dimension of the 
EU’s Performance in International Institutions: Towards a More Comprehensive Assessment 
Framework’ (2015) 53(6) JCMS 1319. 
13 We use ‘international institutions’ rather than ‘international organizations’ so as to 
be able to include not only formal international organizations (such as the UN) but also 
related processes such as the UNFCCC (the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
a Treaty-based process with the Conference of the Parties as a formal Treaty-based body).
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2. State of the art: legal and political approaches  
to EU external performance
To allow us to make a case for a more integrated approach, this section 
encompasses the state of the art of literature on the connection between 
formal provisions and (informal) practices in EU policy-making and in 
EU external relations. After briefly revisiting the categories of shared 
external competences, the autonomy of the EU and Member State actors 
is assessed on the basis of the prevailing literature on EU actorness and 
effectiveness. The main purpose of the present section is to try and 
highlight a number of themes in the study of both disciplines that are 
mutually relevant, despite the fact that they are usually not taken into 
account by the other discipline.
2.1 A clear legal framework?
In legal scholarship on EU external action, the notion of competences 
is key. The nuanced approach to competences, and in particular to 
shared competences, as developed in legal doctrine is hardly visible in 
political science studies on similar topics, irrespective of the explanatory 
value of this nuanced approach. Among lawyers it is a truism that, as a 
legal principle, the EU only has the competences conferred upon it by 
the Treaties.14 In an ‘ever closer union’ the EU and its Member States 
share competences on nearly every issue of European political life, as 
the competences that are exclusively in the hands of the Union are 
limited.15 The Treaties contain a quite precise catalogue of competences 
spelling out the different types of EU competences:16
• exclusive competences, where only the Union has legislative 
power;17
• shared competences, where both the Union and the Member States 
have legislative power;18 and
14 Article 5 TEU.
15 Article 3 TFEU, compare with Pollack (n 7) 519.
16 Article 2 TFEU.
17 Article 3 TFEU, e.g. common commercial policy, monetary policy for eurozone Member 
States, customs union.
18 Article 4 TFEU, e.g. internal market, environment, transport, energy, consumer 
protection.
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• supportive competences, where the Union can support, coordinate 
or supplement the actions of Member States, but cannot supersede 
the competence of Member States in that policy area.19
Competences in the area of the common foreign, security and 
defence policy are not further defined, apart from the acknowledge-
ment that the Union does enjoy a competence in that area.20 Yet, the 
Treaty context makes clear that competences in this area are shared 
between the Union and its Member States, allowing them – at least to a 
certain extent – to act in parallel.21
At the same time, practice reveals that, in relation to shared 
competences in particular, it remains difficult to define the exact 
division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Part 
of the problem is that ‘shared competences’ is a broad category and it 
is particularly the nuances that may also be helpful for political science 
studies to allow for a better understanding of the different situations of 
EU external performance. Four sub-categories of shared competences 
have been said to provide a more nuanced picture of the possible 
competence divisions between the EU and its Member States.22 The first 
category contains shared pre-emptive competences, where Member State 
action is only excluded if the EU has already taken action on the issue. 
Second, in the case of shared non-pre-emptive competences Member State 
action is not excluded as long as the EU has not fully deployed a policy 
field. Third, shared competences in case of minimum Union standards are 
identified, where Member States can adopt more stringent measures. 
Fourth, as we have seen, shared competence in the field of foreign and 
security policy can perhaps best be categorized as ‘parallel’ competences. 
We believe that for an analytical framework it is important to differ-
entiate between these different sub-categories as they may all – in 
their own way – have an impact on the performance of the EU and its 
Member States in international institutions, in particular since they 
restrain Member State action in different ways.
With a view to the present article’s aim to assess the functioning 
of shared competences in the context of international organizations and 
conferences, it is important to recall that these days, several EU Treaty 
provisions provide a solid basis for the Union to establish a formal 
19 Article 6 TFEU, e.g. industry, culture, civil protection, tourism.
20 Article 2(4) TFEU.
21 Compare with article 24(2) TEU as well as van Vooren and Wessel (n 9) 347.
22 ibid 99, 102.
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and substantive presence in international organizations.23 This has 
certainly strengthened the EU’s ‘international actorness’ and confirms 
the separate legal status of the EU alongside its Member States.24 
Whereas in political science scholarship the distinction between the 
Union and its members is seen as less relevant (references to the ‘EU28’ 
or earlier to the ‘EU15’ often simply intend to point to the ‘block’ of EU 
institutions and Member States), from a legal perspective the distinction 
between the European Union as an international organization of which 
states can be members, and the (Member) States themselves remains 
essential. 
A consolidation of external policies was clearly foreseen by the 
Lisbon Treaty, which, as held by some observers, now ‘makes Brussels 
the “key locus” of European external action’.25 Yet the above-mentioned 
unclear external division of competences has led legal scholars to regard 
the external relations codification of the Lisbon Treaty as ‘rather unsat-
isfactory’ or they stress its ‘fuzziness’.26 Authors even expressed the 
opinion that the Lisbon Treaty ‘failed in external competences’ as there 
is a need to resort to decades of pre-Lisbon case law from the CJEU to 
establish whether Member States are ‘pre-empted’ to act externally, 
meaning that their traditional international competences are restrained 
because of EU policies or initiatives.27 The fluidity of competences 
in external relations has ‘provided a fertile field for ingenious legal 
argument’ over the interpretation of the Treaties before and after the 
Lisbon Treaty and the extensive case law of the CJEU on external 
relations only testifies to that.28 At the same time, a lack of legal clarity 
offers room for political flexibility.
The final adjudicator of the use of competences in the EU is the 
CJEU. While for EU external relations lawyers the CJEU has been the 
central institution, it has often been overlooked by political scientists. In 
23 Articles 220 and 221 TFEU juncto Articles 3(5) and 21(1) TEU. See, more extensively, 
Ramses A Wessel, ‘The Legal Framework for the Participation of the European Union in 
International Institutions’, in Oberthür, Jørgensen and Shahin (n 1) 23. 
24 Article 47 TEU.
25 Sophie Vanhoonacker and Karolina Pomorska, ‘The European External Action Service 
and Agenda-Setting in European Foreign Policy’ (2013) 20(9) JEPP 1316, 1322.
26 van Vooren and Wessel (n 9) 99, 110 and Christophe Hillion and Ramses A Wessel, 
‘Competence Distribution in EU External Relations after ECOWAS: Clarification or 
Continued Fuzziness?’ (2009) 46(2) CMLR 551, 586.
27 Marcus Klamert, ‘New Conferral or Old Confusion? The Perils of Making Implied 
Competences Explicit and the Example of the External Competence for Environmental 
Policy’ (2011) CLEER Working Paper no 6.
28 John Vogler, ‘The European Union as an Actor in International Environmental Politics’ 
(1999) 8(3) EP 24, 30. See also van Vooren and Wessel (n 9).
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a way, the CJEU may seem to have been helpful in relation to the partici-
pation of the EU in international institutions as a means to exercise its 
competence.29 
At the same time, the CJEU’s case law also underlines that the 
division of competences is not clear-cut and that lawyers may not 
always provide a priori answers. Thus, we have seen that there are 
external effects of an internal use of competences by the EU: Member 
States may be barred from entering international agreements or inter-
national negotiations by themselves as some elements may fall within 
the (de facto exclusive) competences of the Union.30 And, on more than 
one occasion, the CJEU has used the ‘principle of sincere cooperation’ to 
point out that Member States are no longer completely free to engage in 
international activities.31 The controversies reflected in the recent and 
pending cases on the scope of the EU’s external competences, referred 
to in the Introduction to this paper, only testify to the idea that issues 
are far from settled, again leaving scope for political interpretations and 
an influence of findings in political studies.
2.2 A political perspective: EU actorness, cohesiveness 
and effectiveness
Indeed, the absence of legal clarity often leads to a (perceived) political 
flexibility. The concepts of actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness 
traditionally drive the political theoretical perspective on EU external 
action, and we will shortly address all three concepts with a view to 
recent and ongoing debates on this in the relevant literature. There is 
a vast literature on the EU as an ‘effective’ actor in international insti-
tutions. This strand of literature focuses especially on more clear-cut 
EU-led or instead Member State-led policy areas, respectively global 
economic governance and Common Foreign and Security Policy.32 
29 Jan Wouters, Jed Odermatt and Thomas Ramopoulos, ‘The EU in the World of 
International Organizations: Diplomatic Aspirations, Legal Hurdles and Political Realities’ 
(2013) Leuven Centre of Global Governance Studies Working Paper no 121, 4. See Opinion 
1/76 Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels 
[1977] ECR 741, para 5 and Opinion 1/94 Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization [1994] ECR I-5267.
30 See Case 22/70, Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263 (ERTA).
31 Particularly illustrative is Case C-246/07, Commission v Sweden (PFOS) [2010] ECR 
3317. See more extensively for instance Marise Cremona, ‘Case C-246/07, Commission 
v Sweden (PFOS), Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 20 April 2010’ 
(2011) 48(5) CMLR 1639.
32 Andreas Dür and Hubert Zimmerman, ‘Introduction: the EU in International Trade 
Negotiations’ (2007) 45(4) JCMS 771. Sophie Meunier, Trading Voices: the European Union 
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This may explain the absence (to a large extent) of approaches 
dealing with the sharing of competences. This does not mean that 
the relationship between the Union and its Member States has as 
such not been the subject of political studies. The debates between 
scholars that see the Member States as the primary driving force of 
EU integration (intergovernmentalism) and those that claim that it 
is in particular supranational agents that are pushing the integration 
process forward (supranationalism) are well known and remain 
the source of the ‘most important and persistent schism in the EU 
integration literature’.33 
The actorness literature is particularly relevant in our context as 
it shows clear references to legal competences, albeit that the main 
focus is on more ‘informal’ strategies and actions and ‘effectiveness’ of 
EU external action than on formal competences.34 A landmark article 
on actor capacity is written by Jupille and Caporaso, who identify four 
dimensions of actorness: authority, autonomy, external recognition 
and internal cohesiveness.35 Authority refers to the extent of delegated 
competences from the Member States to the EU, which ‘can take many 
different shapes and varies greatly by policy area’.36 The delegation 
of authority can be formal, resulting from Treaty articles, or it can 
be informal, resulting from spill-over in practice. This way of seeing 
authority operating ‘beyond competences’ is echoed by more scholars. 
Vanhoonacker and Pomorska argue that important sources of authority 
are ‘not only the legal competences of an actor but also the expertise in 
a particular issue’.37 
in International Commercial Negotiations (Princeton UP 2005). Alasdair R Young, ‘The Rise 
(and Fall?) of the EU’s Performance in the Multilateral Trading System’ (2011) 33(6) JoEI 
715. Karen E Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (2nd edn, Polity 
Press 2013).
33 Stijn Billiet, ‘Principal-agent Analysis and the Study of the EU: What about the EC’s 
External Relations?’ (2009) 7(4) CEP 435.
34 A recent overview of the actorness concept from 1970–2015: Edith Drieskens, ‘Golden 
or Gilded Jubilee? A Research Agenda for Actorness’ (2016) 24 JEPP.
35 Joseph Jupille and James A Caporaso, ‘States, Agency and Rules: the European 
Union in Global Environment Politics’ in Carolyn Rhodes (ed), The European Union 
in the World Community (Lynne Rienner 1998), 213. Charlotte Bretherton and John 
Vogler in ‘Conceptualizing Actors and Actorness’ in The European Union as a Global Actor 
(Routledge 2006), see that the EU’s ability to act on the world stage depends on the notions 
of presence, opportunity and capability (internal context of EU action) but these broad 
concepts are ‘rather vague’ and operationalization is difficult according to da Conceição-
Heldt and Meunier (n 1) 964. That is why we specifically focus on Jupille and Caporaso’s 
1998 article. 
36 da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (n 1) 961 and Jupille and Caporaso (ibid) 213.
37 Vanhoonacker and Pomorska (n 25) 1319.
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The second dimension of actor capacity is ‘autonomy’, which 
refers to the institutional distinctiveness and independence of an actor 
from other actors.38 An international organization like the EU should 
have ‘a distinctive institutional apparatus, even if it is grounded in, or 
intermingles with, domestic political institutions’.39 The ‘autonomy’ 
concept, which is also visible in many legal studies,40 is also evident in 
the principal-agent theory in which the ‘agent’ (mostly the European 
Commission) is able to make decisions and negotiate on behalf of the 
principal(s), the Member States. Therefore, in the principal-agent insti-
tutionalist theory approach, the EU is recognized as a separate, (partly) 
autonomous actor and could also pursue its own interests in world 
politics.41 Until now, principal-agent theory has been essentially used in 
policy domains with exclusive EU competences such as trade policy.42 
Furthermore, principal-agent theory seems more oriented towards 
internal control mechanisms than enabling cooperation towards 
external actors. Opportunities are especially seen in the external 
context, not internally.43 
The third dimension of actorness is the recognition by others. It is 
seen as ‘the sine qua non of global actorhood’, understood as acceptance 
of and interaction with the entity by others.44 The legal dimension is 
clear because recognition can be de jure and de facto. De jure recognition 
is seen as diplomatic recognition under diplomatic law and formal 
membership of international organizations. De facto recognition of 
the EU is given whenever third parties decide to interact with the EU 
and thus implicitly recognize it as an international actor.45 Similar 
to ‘authority’, recognition is thus based on both formal and informal 
notions.
38 Jupille and Caporaso (n 35) 213. See also Labinot Greiçevci, ‘EU Actorness in 
International Affairs: the Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo’ (2011) 12(3) PoEPaS 283.
39 ibid 217.
40 See recently and for references to earlier literature Tamas Molnár, ‘The Concept of 
Autonomy of EU Law from the Comparative Perspective of International Law and the Legal 
Systems of Member States’ (2015) 3 HYILEL 433.
41 Stephen A Ross, ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: the Principal’s Problem’ (1973) 
63(2) TAER 134. Darren Hawkins, David A Lake, Daniel L Nielson and Michael J Tierney, 
‘Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-agent Theory’ 
(2006) 3 DAIO 27 and Xi Jin and Madeleine O Hosli, ‘Pre and Post Lisbon: European Union 
Voting in the United Nations General Assembly’ (2013) 36(6) WEP 1274.
42 Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig, ‘Principals, Agents and the European Union’s Foreign 
Economic Policies’ (2011) 18(3) JEPP 323.
43 Bretherton and Vogler (n 35). Bretherton and Vogler also point out that ‘opportunity 
denotes the external environment of ideas and events – the context which frames and 
shapes EU action or inaction’ (p 24).
44 Jupille and Caporaso (n 35) 213, 214–15.
45 ibid, and da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (n 1) 965.
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The fourth dimension of actor capacity, internal cohesiveness, 
is related to the well-known debate on a ‘single voice’ of the EU 
and the Member States and the related effectiveness. It entails that 
Member States neither undermine nor overrule the collective position 
to be defended with a single voice, even if they disagree with it.46 
Cohesiveness is an even more demanding concept than ‘one voice’ 
because it requires the authority of such voice, external recognition and 
autonomy from Member States47 and follows a logical sequential order 
with these other dimensions.48 Recently, however, this has become 
subject to debate in political science. Some even ask the question 
whether a common position is necessary at all for the EU to be an 
effective actor.49 With this in mind, cohesiveness might even ‘diminish 
the EU’s bargaining power, efficiency and flexibility’.50 Earlier political 
literature already suggests that a certain disunity can occasionally be a 
source of strength, used as a bargaining chip in international negotia-
tions.51 For the purpose of the present article, it is worthwhile to note 
that the operationalization of the concept of cohesiveness is very much 
driven by formal competences. Da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, for 
example, choose to simply use the formal rules of decision-making to 
operationalize the concept of internal cohesiveness, which means that 
internal cohesiveness is highest in the case of ‘exclusive competences’ 
and ‘medium’ in case of shared competences.
The ‘single voice’ debate is also visible in the growing literature 
on effectiveness where the EU is seen as a (collective) actor. ‘Common 
wisdom’ suggests that the higher the cohesiveness the higher the effec-
tiveness, but a variety of policy areas suggests that the relationship, if 
it exists, is more complex.52 External effectiveness refers to the actors’ 
ability to realize the goals they set for themselves.53 The concept of effec-
tiveness traditionally assumes a positive and direct correlation between 
the degree of internal cohesiveness and the EU’s external effectiveness.54 
46 da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (n 1) 966.
47 Macaj and Nicolaidis (n 8) 1069.
48 Jupille and Caporaso (n 35) 213.
49 Macaj and Nicolaidis (n 8) 1070.
50 da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (n 1) 970.
51 Thomas C Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard UP 1960/1980); Robert D 
Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-level Games’ (1988) 42(3) 
IO 427.
52 da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (n 1) 969.
53 Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston (eds), Crafting Cooperation: Regional 
International Institutions in Comparative Perspective (CUP 2007). 
54 Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E Smith (eds), The European Union at the United 
Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms (Palgrave 2006). Louise van Schaik, EU Effectiveness 
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Recently, however, a second wave of scholarship has actively started to 
question the causal link between actorness, cohesiveness and effective-
ness, most likely due to the ineffectiveness of EU external action since 
the Lisbon Treaty.55 
Like cohesiveness, effectiveness is increasingly seen not as a binary 
measure but as a continuum. As held by Niemann and Bretherton, 
effectiveness has historically been ‘notoriously difficult to analyse and 
assess’.56 This has largely to do with the fact that the concept of effec-
tiveness has traditionally been equated with goal achievement. Recent 
contributions have been looking more closely at the input and process 
side instead of ‘only’ the outcomes.57 Oberthür and Groen already 
see a scope for further investigating their assessment framework of 
effectiveness components by embedding it in a broader explanatory 
framework including ‘additional’ internal factors such as mixity of 
competences, coordination arrangements under the Lisbon Treaty and 
the external institutional context.58 This conceptual framework could 
also serve as a basis for a broader comparative research programme 
across policy fields.59 Earlier, also Van Schaik (2013) expected EU 
competence to substantially affect the Union’s actorness and effec-
tiveness in negotiations, while paying attention to the international 
negotiating context.60
2.3 confronting legal and political theories
Our brief overview of the prevailing legal and political insights into the 
EU’s potential to act globally alongside its Member States underlines 
what some others have found before: while legal and political theories 
on EU and Member State actors in international negotiations contain 
insights that are mutually helpful for both disciplines, they are hardly 
and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More than the Sum of its Parts (Palgrave Macmillan 
2013).
55 Daniel C Thomas, ‘Still Punching Below its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in 
European Union Foreign Policy’ (2012) 50(3) JCMS 457; Arne Niemann and Charlotte 
Bretherton, ‘EU External Policy at the Crossroads: the Challenge of Actorness and 
Effectiveness’ (2013) 27(3) IR 261; Tom Delreux, ‘EU Actorness, Cohesiveness and 
Effectiveness in Environmental Affairs’ (2014) 21(3) JEPP 1017. 
57 Iulian Romanyshyn, ‘Explaining EU Effectiveness in Multilateral Institutions: the Case 
of the Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations’ (2015) 53(4) JCMS 875.
58 Oberthür and Groen (n 12). 
59 Sebastian Oberthür and Lisanne Groen, ‘Explaining Goal Achievement in International 
Negotiations: the EU and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change’ (2017) 24 JEPP.
60 van Schaik (n 54).
56 Niemann and Bretherton (n 55) 261.
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confronted or combined.61 While this generalization does not do justice 
to studies using a more ‘law in context’ approach, mainstream legal 
scholars do have a tendency to focus on ‘formal’ Treaty provisions 
and on case law with a view of establishing the correct division of 
competences between the EU and its Member States or between the 
institutions.62 Political theories, while even less generalizable, are 
more oriented towards power and less towards the legal competence 
behind this power. And, as we all occasionally experience, it is indeed 
difficult for one academic discipline to contribute to debates in the 
other. Interdisciplinary academic workshops not infrequently underline 
that lawyers and political scientists simply raise and study different 
questions, despite the fact that the overall answer they are looking for 
may be similar.
Indeed, as underlined by our short literature overview, the 
different disciplinary perspectives remain obvious. Where formalities 
are a key element in legal studies, they are far less important in a 
political perspective. The essence of an empirical analysis is more on 
‘informal’ strategies and action. In addition to the formal rules on deci-
sion-making and representation, analysts ‘need to consider the informal 
behaviour of actors when determining the degree of internal cohesive-
ness of the EU in a particular external setting’.63 Some even state in this 
regard that the formal status ‘plays an inferior role’ in actor capability.64 
At the same time, our short analysis of the debates on actorness, 
cohesiveness and effectiveness reveals the sometimes invisible links 
between the various approaches, especially in more ‘institutionalist’ 
political theories. In analysing EU actorness and cohesiveness, the 
competence division is often part of and sometimes even driving the 
empirical analysis. As a result, policy areas characterized by shared 
competences almost automatically fall into ‘medium’ categories with 
moderate and impractical recommendations. Empirical analyses related 
to the concept of actorness often do not ‘allow to separate EU and 
Member State action’.65 Admittedly, also from a legal perspective the 
‘in-between’ category of shared competences is often overlooked; the 
61 Tom Delreux, ‘The European Union in International Environmental Negotiations: a 
Legal Perspective on the Internal Decision-Making Process’ (2006) 6(3) IEA:PLaE 231; 
Jørgensen and Wessel (n 12) 261. 
62 Jørgensen and Wessel (n 12) 285.
63 da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (n 1) 967.
64 Gehring, Oberthür and Mühleck (n 1) 849.
65 Drieskens (n 34) 6; Gehring, Oberthür and Mühleck (n 1) 849.
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focus is often on exclusivity. Yet it is the broad category of shared powers 
where legal factual answers increasingly fall short in explaining what 
happens in practice. In these policy areas a combination of analysing 
formalities, case law and informal strategies would add to both new 
academic insights, and perhaps even to more effective diplomacy. It 
is especially in these policy areas that the current academic silos are 
problematic and a confrontation of legal and political perspectives 
would be helpful. The practical and well-documented example of EU 
climate negotiations in the next section points to the necessity of an 
integrative analytical framework.
A final bridge between legal and political studies on EU external 
relations may be found in the attention both disciplines pay to ‘institu-
tions’ and ‘institutionalization’. The notion that ‘institutions matter’ is 
fundamental to the approach in both many political science and legal 
approaches. Indeed, this may very well be one of the ‘nodal points’ 
where law and politics are closely intertwined.66 One clear example 
is formed by institutionalist explanations of the existence of external 
powers. The idea that the ‘modes and effects of external governance 
are shaped by internal EU modes of governance’67 is echoed in more 
legalistic contributions, where – in a way and perhaps ironically – EU 
external relations law is largely about an intra-EU competence division.
3. An empirical starting point: political and legal 
perspectives on EU climate negotiations
This third section aims to assess the above introductory mapping exercise 
on potential areas of mutual interest from a practice perspective. On 
the basis of a combination of existing literature, treaty provisions, case 
law and some findings from semi-structured interviews, we will focus 
on one particular policy area of EU external action which is defined 
by a shared competence: climate change. Using findings from both 
political and legal perspectives on EU external action at the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), we 
aim to formulate the basis for an integrative politico-legal analytical 
framework on the use of EU shared competences at international 
institutions. 
66 Jørgensen and Wessel (n 12) 275.
67 Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing 
External Governance in European Politics’ (2009) 16(6) JEPP 791. 
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International discussions on climate change take place in various 
international forums throughout the year. The most important forum 
is the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The COP is the 
supreme decision-making body of the UNFCCC and all 195 members 
are invited to participate in these meetings. The EU is a party to the 
UNFCCC as are all EU Member States in their own right. Following 
Articles 4 and 191 TFEU, Member States and the EU share their 
competence in the area of environmental policy. Within their respective 
spheres of competence the Union and Member States ‘shall co-operate’ 
with third countries and with the competent international organiza-
tions.68 The policy field of environment and climate change is a typical 
example of a shared pre-emptive competence in the classification of shared 
competences as described in the previous section.69 This implies that 
both EU and Member State actors may engage in diplomatic relations 
with third (state) partners and international organizations, as long as 
EU action has not led to a pre-emption of Member State initiatives and 
the principle of sincere cooperation is taken into account. We analyse 
the enabling/restraining effect of the legal competence framework on 
EU and Member State actions as compared to other possible approaches 
and variables.
The findings are based on multiple sources of information, which 
are brought together through triangulation. Primary research has 
been conducted on written academic expert sources. Besides, Treaty 
provisions and EU case law on environmental and climate issues, 
dealing with (external) shared competences and the ‘duty of sincere 
cooperation’, have been analysed. Moreover, to deepen the analysis, 
eight semi-structured in-depth interviews70 have been conducted, 
with (leading) negotiators from both the EU and Member States and 
(content-wise) experts having a more ‘external perspective’. 
As regards the timeframe, this analysis focuses on the process from 
the Copenhagen climate change conference (2009) and the ‘pre-Lisbon 
Treaty phase’ until the UNFCCC COP21 in Paris (2015). The main 
68 Article 191(4) TFEU.
69 However, one should take into account that the EU’s legislative intervention is limited 
to minimum harmonization of environmental policy. The Member States can lay down 
more strict legal norms to protect their public goods. As such ‘the pre-emptive effect 
mentioned in article 4 does not actually take place, since the Member States can continue 
to legislate even in the domains covered by EU legislation, as long as they comply with 
the minimum norms laid down by the Union’; see Adam Lazowski and Steven Blockmans, 
Research Handbook on EU Institutional Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 58.
70 The interviews have been conducted by one of the authors.
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focus is on the large international climate change conferences, but 
also environmental day-to-day diplomacy is part of the analysis and 
the questions in semi-structured interviews. The main outcomes of this 
study are presented here.
3.1 Effects of shared competences in practice
We found that the ‘shared competences’ legal framework has an 
effect on power relations in international climate negotiations in at 
least three ways. First, as a general basis, the nature of (external) 
competences is fixed by the Treaties. This is already an important step. 
As argued above, for the actual analysis of external power relations, it 
makes quite a difference whether a competence is exclusive, shared or 
supportive. Our case study reveals that this is recognized by the actors. 
Thus, for instance, the European Commission is (generally) the actor 
to contact in the World Trade Organization as trade is an ‘exclusive’ 
EU competence,71 irrespective of the fact that the Member States are 
still present. In international institutions where the EU and Member 
States ‘share competences’, such as the UNFCCC, the mentioned 
‘nuanced’ nature of shared competences is indeed acknowledged and 
more fine-tuning is necessary. As one of the diplomats put it: sharing 
competences does not implicate a ‘fifty–fifty’ relationship.72 
Second, it is not only the Treaty that legally defines the conduct 
of power relations in international organizations; the CJEU’s case law is 
also to be used as guidance as it may provide further explanation of the 
often quite general Treaty rules and principles. Above, we have referred 
to the link between internal and external EU competences: whenever 
the European Union has elaborated measures in a particular policy area 
internally, it is generally allowed to conduct external relations in that 
domain. In that way, one of the Member State foreign services seems to 
be right on their website by expressing the opinion that the EU external 
competence framework is more of a dynamic than a static process.73 
Again, it is clear that political actors become aware of the dynamic 
changes in the division of competences once they are confronted with 
them in practice.
71 Article 2 TFEU on common commercial policy.
72 Interview, 2 April 2014.
73 Original text: ‘de bevoegdheidsverdeling op het terrein van de externe betrekkingen 
is niet statisch, maar dynamisch’ <http://www.minbuza.nl/ecer/dossiers/externe-
betrekkingen/exclusieve-en-gedeelde-externe-bevoegdheden-van-de-eu.html>.
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Third, there is a more specific delegation process derived from 
the sharing of competences in the policy area of climate change. The 
EU and its Member States have invented specific types of ‘actors’ in the 
multilateral climate negotiations, so-called ‘lead negotiators’ and ‘issue 
leaders’. These negotiators and issue leaders are chosen among the EU 
and Member State representatives, independent of their institutional 
origin. This inventive arrangement is an indirect consequence of the 
‘shared competences’ in the environmental field and is recognized by 
the political actors.
A key question in the context of the present contribution is to 
what extent shared competences enable or restrain EU and Member 
State actors in the specific case of UNFCCC negotiations. Our case 
study revealed that shared external competences enable the European 
Commission to keep EU Member States as part of the negotiating team 
as there would be legal consequences when they would negotiate 
separately from the EU. Furthermore, internal legislation enables the 
European Commission as an EU actor to increase its coordinating role. 
However, it has also become clear that shared external competences 
restrain the European Commission as it is unable to side-line the Member 
States – something it can more easily do in external trade negotiations. 
As a mirror-image of this situation, shared external competences enable 
the EU Member State actors (large and small) to play a significant role 
in climate change negotiations. This sometimes leads to deep disagree-
ment between Member States.74 Poland, for example, could threaten 
with a CO2 veto until the last moment of climate change negotiations.
75 
Shared external competences also restrain Member State actors. In the 
UNFCCC setting, Member State actors were looking for the ‘margins’ of 
what was agreed upon collectively to define a more detailed Member 
State profile, but there is a general settlement that it is not appropriate 
to ‘colour outside the lines’ – hence, to stay within the limits set by the 
legal competences.76 
Occasionally – and obviously – Member States consider an EU 
competence to be a ‘legal straitjacket’ that ‘forces them to coordinate’; 
they suspect it to be merely used by the Commission to expand its 
powers.77 However, it is only when issues are getting ‘really political’ 
74 Jakob Skovgaard, ‘EU Climate Policy after the Crisis’ (2014) 23(1) EP 15.
75 Andrew Rettman, ‘Poland Vetoes CO2 Targets on the Eve of Paris Visit’ EU Observer 
(Brussels, 28 October 2015) <https://euobserver.com/environment/130867>.
76 Interview, 3 April 2015.
77 van Schaik (n 54).
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that rules, procedures and other legal issues become less relevant than 
political considerations. Prior to this situation, legal rules are indeed the 
main driver of the division of powers between EU and Member State 
actors, and in that sense they do define the conduct of international 
negotiations. Thus, one may tend to conclude that legal competences 
are the starting point, but that they are put into perspective once 
issues become very political (which is often the case in international 
negotiations).
Indeed, climate change is often portrayed as a very political, 
conflict-driven policy area because of the Copenhagen failure (2009). 
In that sense it is interesting to note that the interviews sketch a 
quite friendly internal EU policy negotiating environment during the 
negotiation of a common EU and Member States’ position. Our finding 
supports the idea that this more friendly environment is enabled by 
the legal competence framework which already sets the stage and 
renders some debates obsolete. The European Commission could start 
an infringement procedure when it is overruled by Member States in 
representation at climate change negotiations. However, it may choose 
not to do so purely on political grounds. As one of the interviewees puts 
it: the issue of climate change is too treacherous to bring a case to the 
CJEU.78 This example makes clear that the Commission is hesitant in 
confronting Member States on their diplomatic behaviour when the 
stakes are higher at the international scene and, moreover, the topic 
itself is considered as ‘high politics’ for the EU. This, in turn, is a clear 
example of political influence on the use of legal rules and principles 
(and the other way around).
3.2 Other explanatory causes and theories
Apart from the formal rules on shared competences, other, more informal, 
possible explanatory causes and effects are also identified, including 
external incentives. Most theories focus particularly on the balance of 
power between (large) Member States, ‘socialization’ of representa-
tives from Member States, and voting power of Member States and EU 
representatives.79 For example, EU socialization means that EU Member 
78 Interview, 7 October 2015. See for a case where the Commission did initiate 
legal proceedings: Geert De Braere, ‘Mercury Rising: the European Union and the 
International Negotiations for a Globally Binding Instrument on Mercury’ (2012) 37(5) 
ELR 640. 
79 Respectively, Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E Smith (eds) The European Union at 
the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms (Palgrave 2006), Martijn LP Groenleer and
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States’ representatives involved in deciding on and negotiating the EU 
position in international institutions first and foremost adapt a European 
orientation.80 Social norms cannot be put aside, but legal–institutional 
norms and the procedure derived from the legal competence framework 
may very well accelerate these social norms. 
As indicated by the existing literature, ‘preference heterogeneity’ – 
in the sense of (the absence of) aligning interests – and (large) Member 
State power are also considered primary causes of EU and Member State 
negotiation behaviour. However, environment and climate change are 
‘typical EU policy’ fields, where of course preference heterogeneity 
exists, but where there is a general tendency towards cooperation. The 
Commission would therefore be less inclined to start legal conflicts 
in this policy field. Furthermore, large Member States, such as the 
United Kingdom, see the overall added value of EU cooperation and 
EU competence in multilateral climate change negotiations which 
might also help.81 The EU’s engagement with strategic partners seems 
to be driven by a preference for an ambitious international climate 
deal. In that case, it could also help to analyse the use of other 
common instruments, such as trade, as leverage for a climate deal.82 
Furthermore, the academic, professional or national background of the 
negotiator itself could have an effect on the conduct of negotiations. 
In the run-up to the large UNFCCC COP climate change conference, 
we found that more environmentally oriented policy officers prepared 
the negotiations, sharing not only competences but also background 
and knowledge. Only in the final phase of the conference did political 
leaders set the stage, which could lead to more (political) conflict.83 
Lastly, the statute of the international organization (and the question of 
whether the EU itself is a member of the organization, or whether it has 
to rely on its Member States to present the Union’s position) could lead 
negotiators to work together towards a common EU stance.
Louise G Van Schaik, ‘United We Stand? The European Union’s International Actorness in 
the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol’ (2007) 45(5) JCMS 
969; Jin and Hosli (n 41).
80 van Schaik (n 54) 75.
81 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Environment and Climate Change: Review 
of Balance of Competences’, 13 February 2014 <https://www.gov.uk/government/
consultations/eu-and-uk-action-on-environment-and-climate-change-review>.
82 Louise van Schaik and Ries Kamphof, ‘Using the EU’s Trade Power as Leverage for a 
Climate Deal in Paris’ (2015) Clingendael Policy Brief.
83 Interview, 21 November 2014.
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4. Building blocks for an integrative legal–political 
analysis of shared competences
The mutually relevant notions in legal and political scholarship, 
together with the practical example of shared EU and Member State 
action in UNFCCC COP negotiations underlines the usefulness of 
analysing EU external action in political and legal conjunction. This 
section aims to provide the building blocks and factors that should be 
taken into account when building such an integrative legal–political 
analytical framework. This section first assembles arguments why such 
an integrative framework is useful. Thereafter some methodological 
and issue-based considerations for empirical application are shared. 
Limitations of this approach are also discussed. Obviously, the scope of 
the present contribution merely allows us to, indeed, provide building 
blocks. Further studies are needed to construct the framework.
4.1 Why should legal and political perspectives be combined 
in shared policy areas?
There are at least six reasons why legal and political perspectives could 
and should be combined in an analysis of EU external action and why 
this combination would be particularly helpful to better understand 
areas defined by shared competences. First, in a combined approach 
many (implicit or explicit) assumptions in both approaches and theories 
can be tested more extensively and possible myths can be checked. For 
example, it is often stated that if only the EU would ‘speak with one 
voice’ its performance in a given international organization would be 
significantly improved84 while others state that the ‘legal division of 
labour is seldom strictly followed in practice’.85 
Second, by combining legal and political insights, the conduct of 
EU external relations can be evaluated from (formal) input and process 
to (formal/informal) outcome and (informal) impact, thereby contrib-
uting to the evaluation of EU diplomacy as well as of the effects of treaty 
modifications or new case law on EU external relations.86
Third, as has been visible in the UNFCCC example, sometimes 
competences do not explain the behaviour of EU and Member State 
84 Jørgensen and Wessel (n 12) 285.
85 Tom Delreux, ‘Cooperation and Control in the European Union: the Case of the 
European Union as International Environmental Negotiator’ (2009) 44(2)2 CC 189, 190.
86 Compare with Yvonne Kleistra and Niels van Willigen, ‘Evaluating the Impact of EU 
Diplomacy: Pitfalls and Challenges’ in Koops and Macaj (n 1) 52.
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actors, mostly due to political reasons. An integrative analysis contributes 
to finding this ‘breaking point’.
Fourth, as has been made clear in political contributions in 
particular, legal competences are only part of the authority of actors. 
There are other important sources of authority, including expertise, or 
the link with other policy dossiers.87 
Fifth, information on the usage of strategies, their effectiveness, 
as well as the response of third actors cannot be obtained from official 
documents and formal issues alone. Instead, this information needs to 
be gathered from interviews or process-tracing, which is part of the tool 
box of political scientists.88 As regards these strategies, probably the 
diversity prevailing among EU Member States is also the ‘most precious 
asset’ when acting externally.89 
Sixth, the way competences are used as an intervening variable 
in political analyses and as guiding many legal analyses is problematic 
in case of shared competences. The recent attempt by da Conceição-
Heldt and Meunier, for example, categorizes all policy areas of 
shared competences as ‘medium internal cohesiveness’ and concur-
rently ‘medium external effectiveness’, which does not reveal the 
specificities per policy area. It is questionable whether the EU and its 
Member States are indeed in the same vein ‘internally cohesive’ as 
well as ‘externally effective’ in contradicting policies such as ‘European 
Neighbourhood Policy’ and multilateral environment negotiations. The 
limitation of this focus on ‘internal cohesiveness’ based on competences 
is also visible in the article by Panke, who found that there is very low 
internal cohesion of EU actors in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
‘since there is no exclusive or shared competence for EU action in the 
UNGA’. Yet, it is ‘remarkable’ that the EU succeeds in developing a 
common negotiating position most of the time, that is for about 95 per 
cent of all resolutions.90 This is symptomatic of a political perspective 
on competences, in which it is not acknowledged that the policy 
areas as discussed in the UNGA are indeed already defined by legal 
competences and a related division of labour. Similarly, legal analyses 
often merely look for guidance to the Treaties and the CJEU, without 
87 Vanhoonacker and Pomorska (n 25) 1322.
88 Diana Panke, ‘The European Union in the United Nations: an Effective External Actor?’ 
(2014) 21(7) JEPP 1051, 1054.
89 Macaj and Nicolaidis (n 8) 1067.
90 Panke (n 88) 1052 also citing Diana Panke, ‘Regional Power Revisited: How to Explain 
Differences in Coherency and Success of Regional Organisations in the United Nations 
General Assembly’ (2013) 18 IN 265.
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any thorough analysis of the practical consequences in EU external 
action or its effectiveness.
4.2 methodological and substantive considerations
While there thus are many good reasons to develop an integrative 
analytical framework, at least three considerations need to be addressed. 
First, as we have seen, shared competences are a broad category encom-
passing at least four different types.91 For a step-by-step analysis of 
shared competences at international institutions, it is helpful to differ-
entiate between these sub-categories. Action on the basis of the sub-
categories of shared competences can be assessed in case studies where 
different empirical findings and settings are combined. 
Second, the methodologies used for political and legal perspec-
tives are complementary but also difficult to combine in practice. 
Political scientists would normally use empirical evidence, backed up 
by secondary literature, and document analysis,92 while legal scholars 
would have a tendency to focus on legal texts and support their analysis 
mainly by what others have found as well. Despite the potential that is 
offered by combining empirical and conceptual/analytical methods in 
this particular issue area, prioritizing the information sources will be a 
challenge. 
Third, diplomacy has traditionally been perceived as the prerogative 
of states and their representatives.93 However, exclusivity of diplomacy 
as a state domain is challenged on several fronts, including the variety of 
areas that go beyond the immediate military and political dimensions of 
traditional diplomacy (e.g environmental diplomacy), the extension 
of involved actors, even parliaments.94 For some, the ability to act 
externally as a state-like unit is indispensable to the very existence of the 
EU, and we have seen that the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
was created as an attempt to do exactly that. 
91 van Vooren and Wessel (n 9) 99.
92 Vanhoonacker and Pomorska (n 25) 1329.
93 Jan Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2005); Andrew F Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur, The 
Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (OUP 2013).
94 Stelios Stavridis and Davor Janc̆ić, ‘Introduction: the Rise of Parliamentary Diplomacy 
in International Politics’ (2016) 11 THJOD 105.
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4.3 current limitations
The combination of legal and political insights could help in assessing 
shared external competences in practice and in particular their enabling 
or restraining effect on EU and Member State actors in interna-
tional institutions. The present authors do, however, recognize some 
important limitations. First, while legal approaches, despite their 
variety, often share a focus on interpretations of the Treaties, decisions 
and case law, political science approaches are even more diverse. In 
fact, part of political science is characterized by debates on which 
theories and concepts are more fit to explain reality. In the absence 
of a generalizable approach it is difficult to bring ‘political theory’ 
in general closer to the legal approach and it is needed to pinpoint 
specific, more institutionalist, theories or concepts such as actorness or 
effectiveness to allow for a sensible connection. Second, the question 
of competences is ‘fundamentally also one of national constitutional 
norms’.95 Therefore, some Member State actors or entities might be 
more oriented on the division of competences than others. For example, 
federal states such as Germany have experience with a clear-cut division 
of competences in their own constitution, while the United Kingdom 
does not have a single constitutional document. This can be pre-empted 
by taking into consideration ‘other explanatory variables’ in the analysis 
framework. Third, EU negotiations at, for instance, the United Nations 
tend to be multi-issue in scope, either because multiple issues are 
formally under discussion at the same time and thus subject to explicit 
trade-offs or because actors’ preferences with regard to upcoming 
issues can be leveraged against present concessions.96 Such ‘multi-issue 
negotiation’ complicates the assessment of competences in practice and 
combining approaches as both approaches would not analyse the whole 
chain of negotiations in international organizations such as the UN. 
Nevertheless, we would argue, this would be much easier recognized 
when political and legal insights are combined, rather than taking a 
single academic perspective.
Additional methodological challenges with regard to a politico-
legal analysis of shared competences in international negotiations 
relate to the fact that the work of the preferred study objects (EU and 
95 Joseph HH Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?’ 
and Other Essays on European Integration (CUP 1999), 322.
96 Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo and Daniel C Thomas, ‘Negotiation Theory and the EU: 
the State of the Art’ (2010) 17(5) JEPP 613, 615. 
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Member State diplomats) is surrounded by ‘secrecy’ and anonymity.97 
It is necessary to hear different sides and also keep the interviews 
confidential. By combining multiple interview sources (diplomatic/
academic) and studies (expert sources/case law), the analysis allows for 
a triangulation of findings.
As already observed by Macaj and Nicolaidis, ‘to assess whether 
a desirable outcome in the world has anything to do with some action 
taken by the EU or its member states, let alone with the fact of unity 
itself, is at best an exercise in probability. Correlation does not imply 
causation and even careful process tracing gives us at best a sense of 
likelihood of impact.’98 The preliminary findings can thus best be char-
acterized as ‘plausibility probes’ only, providing interesting avenues 
for future research. These plausibility probes would need further 
testing in other cases to become more robust.99 They make conditions 
under which the EU can turn into an effective external actor more 
clear, even in contexts in which its (formal) actor capacities are very 
limited.100 Yet, the in-depth interviews and ‘plausibility probes’ might 
be a very relevant addition to the literature as most studies focus 
only on voting outcomes and/or representation statements, which 
merely reflect the outcome of a ‘longer chain of decision-making and 
cannot capture the essence of the process before this final decision’.101 
Voting outcomes ‘do not provide insight into the extent that different 
actors actually managed to influence the content of resolutions’, 
but only give an indication of which states are not satisfied with the 
negotiation outcome.102 Case studies are better equipped to answer 
‘how and why questions’, as Yin puts it.103 However, as Blatter 
and Haverland contemplate, case-study research has also been an 
excuse for ‘methodologically unreflective research’ in recent academic 
history.104 A reflection on the commonalities and differences in the 
cases and the difficulties in practice should thus be included. 
 97 Sanderijn Duquet and Jan Wouters, ‘Diplomacy, Secrecy and the Law’ (2015) Leuven 
Working Paper no 151.
 98 Macaj and Nicolaidis (n 8) 1070.
 99 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (MIT Press 2005).
100 Panke (n 88) 1054.
101 Jin and Hosli (n 41) 1274.
102 Panke (n 88) 1054 also citing Robert O Keohane, ‘The Study of Political Influence in 
the General Assembly’ (1967) 21 IO 221. 
103 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th edn, SAGE 2013).
104 Joachim Blatter and Markus Haverland, ‘Case Studies and (Causal-) Process Tracing’ 
in Isabelle Engeli and Christine Rothmayr Allison (eds), Comparative Policy Studies: 
Conceptual and Methodological Challenges (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 59, 63.
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5. Conclusion
The division of legal competences between the EU and Member 
States and its effects on EU external action has been raised as one of 
the top priority EU existential questions. Political elites and analysts 
often narrow this discussion down to either retreating the ‘creeping’ 
competences105 of the EU or supporting the ‘single voice mantra’106 
to be a more effective external actor. By combining legal and political 
perspectives, formal rules and informal practices, practical effects of 
‘shared competences’ could be analysed in more detail. The main brief 
of this contribution has therefore been to map factors that should 
form part of an ‘integrative’ legal–political analysis of shared EU and 
Member State external action. The findings from the well-documented 
‘shared competences’ policy area of EU climate negotiations in the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), combined 
with a more general analysis of useful links between legal and political 
perspectives, serve as a first answer. 
We argue that in a combined approach many implicit assumptions 
in both approaches and theories can be tested more extensively. By 
looking at formal rules and informal provisions, EU external action 
could be evaluated from (formal) input and process to (more informal) 
outcome and impact. Information such as the effectiveness of strategies 
as well as the response of third actors (think of the perceived problems 
third countries have with the complex division of EU and Member State 
competences) cannot be obtained from formal provisions alone. At the 
same time, informalities are often restricted by acknowledged formal 
rules on a division of competences.
The practical example of shared EU and Member State action 
in our case study on the UNFCCC COP negotiations supports the 
usefulness of analysing EU external action in a combined political and 
legal manner. The legal rules on ‘shared competences’ prove to enable 
or restrain EU and Member State actors in climate change negotiations 
in three ways. First, via the fixed Treaty provisions on environment. 
Second, through the case law of the CJEU that can be considered to 
have an impact, in particular through the development of principles 
such as the ‘duty of sincere cooperation’ and ‘implied powers’. Third, 
through the more specific delegation process as part of day-to-day 
politics in the EU via working arrangements. In addition to these 
105 Pollack (n 7) 519.
106 Macaj and Nicolaidis (n 8) 1067.
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key variables, other, more informal, factors explain EU and Member 
State action, such as EU socialization and expertise of the negotiators. 
Interestingly, when issues become more conflictual and ‘political’, legal 
issues seem to be less prescriptive in the conduct of negotiations at the 
UNFCCC by EU and Member State actors. 
In ‘shared’ policy areas, a combination of analysing formalities, 
case law and informal strategies would provide new insights into the 
actual functioning and the effects of shared competences. We pointed 
to a number of factors to be taken into account in setting up a legal–
political analysis in this area. First, it is important to acknowledge 
the different forms of shared competences as they may each define 
political behaviour in their own way. Further, there is a methodo-
logical complexity in combining political and legal perspectives, which 
results in the difficulty of prioritizing methods and findings on the 
basis of objective criteria. The (empirical) findings should therefore 
be based on multiple sources of information, which are brought 
together through triangulation. A reflection on the commonalities 
and differences in the cases and the difficulties in practice should also 
be included.
The results from our study on climate change can only be valued 
as so-called ‘plausibility probes’, providing interesting avenues for 
future research, but it is acknowledged that they need further testing 
in other cases to become more robust.107 While research on the effects 
of the Treaty-based division of competences may be the most obvious 
candidate, further research could in particular look at the role of the 
CJEU in EU external relations and the effects of case law on political 
practice.108 The CJEU is still one of the more overlooked actors in more 
political studies on EU external relations. The role of the CJEU and the 
effect of its judgments on the role of actors in areas such as environ-
mental policy or foreign and security policy are hardly acknowledged 
in political analyses.109 The Treaty merely provides a starting point, but 
the actual competences of both the EU and its Member States depend on 
an ongoing process of new policy initiatives on the side of the Union and 
an interpretation by the CJEU. In turn, an emerging question is to what 
extent the actual use of legal competences is influenced by (pragmatic) 
political choice.
107 George and Bennett (n 99).
108 Compare with Christophe Hillion and Ramses A Wessel, ‘Competence Distribution in 
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To become more robust, findings of larger comparative case 
studies are also needed. Policy areas at other international institutions in 
which the EU operates on the basis of different forms of shared external 
competences (and where different case law applies) can then be added, 
including for example development aid (shared non-pre-emptive 
competence), social policies (International Labour Organization, shared 
competences in case of minimum Union standards), or military issues 
(NATO and UN organs, shared competences in the field of foreign 
and security policy). Furthermore, it will also be relevant to assess the 
effects of the separate legal status of the EU in particular international 
organizations on the influence of the EU in that particular policy area. 
And, finally, we hardly know anything about the effects of the complexi-
ties surrounding shared competences on third parties during interna-
tional negotiations.
Overall, our analysis is to be understood as a plea to combine 
existing and new political and legal insights to better understand the 
effects of legal choices on political practice (and vice versa). The present 
contribution has provided a number of reasons to further develop this 
new area of research.
